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A B S T R A C T
Do people engaged in joint action form action plans that specify joint outcomes at the group level? EEG was
recorded from pairs of participants who performed coordinated actions that could result in diﬀerent postural
conﬁgurations. To isolate individual and joint action planning processes, a pre-cue speciﬁed in advance the
individual actions and/or the joint conﬁguration. Participants had 1200ms to prepare their actions. Then a Go
cue speciﬁed all action parameters and participants performed a synchronized action as quickly as possible.
Action onsets were shorter when the pre-cue speciﬁed the joint conﬁguration, regardless of whether individual
action was also speciﬁed. EEG analyses showed that specifying joint action parameters in advance reduced
ambiguity in a structured joint action plan (reﬂected in the decrease of the amplitude of the P600) and helped
with representing action goals and interpersonal coordination patterns in sensorimotor brain areas (reﬂected in
increased alpha/mu suppression and CNV amplitudes). These results provide clear evidence that joint action is
driven not only by action plans that specify individual contributions, but also by action plans that specify joint
action outcomes at the group level.
1. Introduction
A wide range of human activities, such as passing a ball, carrying a
bed, or performing in a music ensemble, depend on individuals' ability
to eﬀectively coordinate their actions (Butterﬁll, 2011; Clark, 1996;
D'Ausilio et al., 2015). It has been postulated that interpersonal co-
ordination can be achieved when co-actors form joint action plans that
consist of predictive mental representations of the individual con-
tributions to a joint action (Bolt and Loehr, 2017). Such representations
do not only specify abstract outcomes at the cognitive level but also
action parameters at the sensorimotor level (Sebanz and Knoblich,
2009). The realization of such joint action plans is made possible
through a neural mechanism that matches actions to their perceptual
consequences (Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997), thus allowing in-
dividuals to form forward internal models of actions (Wolpert and
Flanagan, 2001) in order to simulate and predict the consequences of
another person's actions in a similar way as their own actions (Knoblich
and Jordan, 2003; Ramnani and Miall, 2004).
An open question is whether joint action plans consist of separate
predictive representations for one's own (“I-representations”) and a co-
actor's performance (“You-representations”) or whether they include
predictive action representations at the group level (Della Gatta et al.,
2017; Knoblich et al., 2011; Vesper et al., 2010), also referred to as
“We-representations” or the “We-mode” (Gallotti and Frith, 2013). The
core idea is that joint action is driven by plans that specify ﬁrst and
foremost what can be achieved by the group and not by what each
individual contributes to the joint action. Alternatively, successful joint
action could be achieved with action plans that do not explicitly re-
present the relation between one's own and others' contribution to a
joint action.
Empirical evidence for group-level representations has been pro-
vided for action mimicry. Tsai et al. (2011) demonstrated that com-
patibility relations between observed and performed actions at the
group level can overrule compatibility relations at the level of in-
dividual contributions to a joint action. Later studies have corroborated
the role of We-representations for achieving interpersonal synchroni-
zation (Novembre et al., 2016; Ramenzoni et al., 2014; Sacheli et al.,
2018), and for judging the level of individual and joint control during
joint action performance (Dewey et al., 2014; Van der Wel, 2015). A
related ﬁnding is that joint action partners invest individual eﬀort to
reduce joint eﬀort, suggesting that planning at the group level may
have priority over individual action planning (Constable et al., 2016;
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Santamaria and Rosenbaum, 2011).
1.1. Present study
The objective of the present study was to examine whether We-re-
presentations are formed during joint action planning and whether We-
representations beneﬁt joint action performance. To that end, we de-
veloped a pre-cuing task (Rosenbaum, 1980), where a visual pre-cue
either speciﬁed individual action contributions (i.e. making a hand
movement that results in the palm facing inwards or outwards) and/or
a joint action conﬁguration, that is, the relation of individual actions
required for the joint action (i.e. instructing two co-actors to perform
the same or a diﬀerent hand movement without specifying the move-
ment itself). The participants could use this advance information to
prepare a joint action, which they initiated after a visual Go cue that
fully speciﬁed the joint action to be performed. This means that there
was a preparation interval during which participants could form joint
action plans before initiating their actions. An important aspect of our
design was that in one condition participants were informed in advance
of the joint conﬁguration they had to prepare for without the speciﬁc
individual actions they or their partner needed to perform. Better task
performance in this condition would indicate that the formation of We-
representations does not require the speciﬁcation of individual action
contributions.
In line with previous work on pre-cueing of individual actions (e.g.
Reeve and Proctor, 1984; Rosenbaum and Kornblum, 1982), we hy-
pothesized that participants would be faster to initiate their action
when the pre-cue speciﬁed parameters of individual action. Im-
portantly, assuming that joint action plans imply representing the re-
lation between co-actors’ actions and that this in turn facilitates im-
plementing joint action plans, participants should be faster to initiate
their action when the pre-cue speciﬁed aspects of the joint action
conﬁguration even when the individual action contributions are not
speciﬁed.
1.2. EEG investigations of joint action planning
Recording Electroencephalograms (EEG) enabled us to test how
joint action plans beneﬁt performance by looking at brain activity in the
action planning interval, reﬂecting the formation of an action plan in
response to the pre-cue. We tested whether participants form re-
presentations of the joint action plan specifying the joint conﬁguration
to be achieved and the two individual actions necessary to achieve this
conﬁguration. We expected that speciﬁcation of the individual action
and/or the joint conﬁguration would reduce the ambiguity in the
generation of a joint action plan and allow the participants to form
more precise action representations at the sensorimotor level.
1.2.1. Disambiguation in action planning
We expected the information that was provided by the pre-cues to
reduce ambiguity in this structured representation. This can be in-
vestigated through the P600, an Event Related Potential (ERP) that is
associated with processing of structured representations in language
(Osterhout and Holcomb, 1992), music (Patel et al., 1998), and the
action domain (Maﬀongelli et al., 2015). The P600 over frontal areas, in
particular, is believed to reﬂect processing of ambiguous structures
(Friederici et al., 2002; Kaan and Swaab, 2003; Opitz and Kotz, 2012).
Consequently, we expected that the P600 would be reduced when the
pre-cue reduced ambiguity in a joint action plan by specifying aspects
of the joint conﬁguration or the individual actions required to achieve
it.
1.2.2. We-representations at the sensorimotor level
Furthermore, we tested whether the information provided by the
pre-cues would help participants to form more precise action plans at
the sensorimotor level. To this end, we assessed the modulation of the
alpha rhythm (∼10Hz) and of the Contingent Negative Variation (CNV)
before the onset of the Go stimulus.
The alpha rhythm is the dominant rhythm in the human brain
(Bazanova and Vernon, 2013) and suppression of its amplitude reﬂects
activation or disinhibition of the underlying brain areas (Pfurtscheller
and Lopes Da Silva, 1999). Alpha suppression over sensorimotor areas
(often referred to as the “mu rhythm”) reﬂects the involvement of the
sensorimotor system in the representation of planned, executed, per-
ceived or imagined actions (Behmer and Fournier, 2014; Hari, 2006;
Kourtis et al., 2013a, 2013b; Neuper et al., 2005; Pineda, 2005). The
suppression of the alpha/mu rhythm is modulated by a person's en-
gagement in social interaction (Oberman et al., 2007; Perry et al., 2011)
and it is considered an index of sensorimotor processes that contribute
to the representation and the on-line prediction of another person's
action goal (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004; Southgate et al., 2010).
The CNV is a slow rising ERP of negative polarity that develops
during the delay period between an informative cue and a target/im-
perative stimulus and peaks at approximately the time of a planned
response (Walter et al. 1964). The early CNV is related to attentional
and orienting processes towards the informative cue, whereas the late
CNV is related to stimulus anticipation and movement planning pro-
cesses (Leuthold et al., 2004). The late CNV is typically larger over
premotor areas and it is enhanced when movement parameters (e.g.
force, direction) are speciﬁed in advance (Ulrich et al., 2003; Wind-
Wall et al., 2003). Furthermore, the late CNV is believed to reﬂect
preparation and organization of a motor program that involves multiple
actions performed sequentially or synchronously by an individual or by
a pair of individuals (Kourtis et al., 2014; Kourtis et al., 2013a, 2013b;
Leuthold and Schröter, 2011; Praamstra et al., 2009).
We hypothesized that specifying the joint conﬁguration as well as
the individual actions required to achieve it would enable more precise
speciﬁcation of the ensuing action. This, in turn, should be reﬂected in
the enhancement of alpha/mu suppression and the late CNV amplitude
over primary sensorimotor and premotor areas, respectively, before the
display of the Go stimulus. Thus, enhanced alpha/mu suppression and
late CNV during action planning should not only be observed for pre-
cues specifying individual actions but also for pre-cues that solely
specify the joint conﬁguration.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
We based our sample size on previous EEG studies investigating
joint action planning (e.g. Kourtis et al., 2014). We recruited twenty-
four right-handed volunteers (12 females, mean age=25.5 yrs
(SD=4.4)). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and took part in the experiment in pairs. Four pairs of participants
consisted of two males, four pairs of two females and four pairs were of
mixed gender. All participants provided their informed written consent
after full explanation of the study. The study was approved by the ethics
committee of the Hungarian Psychological Association (EPKEP).
2.2. Experimental setup and task
The experiment was run in a quiet, normally illuminated room. EEG
was concurrently recorded from two participants who were seated at
opposite sides of a rectangular table (Height: 74 cm, Surface:
80× 80 cm), facing each other (see Figs. 1A and 2). A 50× 38 x 4
wooden platform was placed centrally on the table. A 40×16×0.5 cm
white wooden occluder was located at the centre of the table. The oc-
cluder served to prevent the participants from seeing each other's sti-
muli. An LCD projector (EPSON, EH-TW490) was used to present the
visual stimuli (9× 9 cm) on the wooden platform at 4 cm distance from
either side of the occluder and at a viewing distance of approximately
80 cm. The projector was mounted on the ceiling directly above the
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middle of the table. Action onsets were recorded by two response boxes
(The Black Box Toolkit Ltd, Sheﬃeld, UK), which were placed in front
of each participant. All experimental sessions were recorded by a video
camera (JVC, CG-XA2) in order to ensure that the participants were
correctly performing the designated actions.
2.3. Procedure and stimuli
Each trial started with a white ﬁxation cross on top of a black
background for 500ms, followed by a pre-cue, presented for 500ms,
providing full, partial or no information regarding the ensuing joint
action. The pre-cue was followed by a blank screen for 700ms, after
which a fully-informative Go signal speciﬁed all individual and joint
action parameters and prompted the participants to act (Fig. 1B).
The pre-cue consisted of a drawing of a hand with the palm facing
outwards, inwards or sideways. The depicted hand always matched the
hand that the participants performed the actions with. The palm or-
ientation provided information regarding the participants’ individual
action. For example, a palm facing outwards informed the participant
that he/she should plan an arm extension with his/her palm facing
outwards (Fig. 2). A palm facing sideways indicated unspeciﬁed in-
formation about the target hand position. On top of the palm there was
a blue box containing one of three white symbols that provided in-
formation regarding the joint action conﬁguration that participants
were going to produce together: “= ” for same, “≠” for diﬀerent, or
rhombus for not speciﬁed (Figs. 1C and 3).
Thus, the pre-cue speciﬁed either both the individual action and the
joint conﬁguration (I+We+), only the individual action (I+We-), only
Fig. 1. [A] Schematic drawing of experimental setup. [B] Time-course of a trial. After a ﬁxation cross the pre-cue provided advance information about the joint
conﬁguration to be performed, the individual action to be performed, both, or neither. The pre-cue was followed by a blank screen. A Go signal that fully speciﬁed the
joint conﬁguration and the individual actions indicated to the participants to perform the action with the partner as quickly as possible. [C] Examples of pre-cues for
each of the four experimental conditions. From Left to Right: I+We+: Speciﬁcation of individual action (palm facing outwards) and of joint conﬁguration (partner
will perform same action). I+We-: Speciﬁcation of individual action (palm facing inwards) but not of joint conﬁguration. I-We+: No information regarding
individual action, but speciﬁcation of joint conﬁguration (partner will perform diﬀerent action). I-We-: No information regarding individual action or joint con-
ﬁguration.
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the joint conﬁguration (I-We+), or neither (I-We-). In order to have the
same number of stimuli per condition, the rhombus was displayed ei-
ther horizontally or vertically with equal probability and the sideways
hand was displayed with the palm facing either to the left or to the right
with equal probability. The (always fully informative) Go stimulus was
identical to the Full Information pre-cue, with the exception that the
colour of the box was green (Fig. 1B).
The experiment consisted of 8 blocks of approximately 5 ½ min
each. Each block consisted of 64 trials, which resulted in 128 trials per
condition. The main experiment was preceded by two practice blocks of
approximately 3min each. The participants used their right hand in one
practice block and in half of the experimental blocks and their left hand
in the remaining blocks. The participants were instructed to always
keep the index ﬁnger of the acting hand on the designated Response
Box button, ﬁxate on the cross, pay attention to the pre-cue and to
initiate their action only after the Go cue was displayed. The partici-
pants were also instructed to ﬁxate on the cross or the stimuli
throughout the trials and to only look towards each other during action
performance.
2.4. EEG data acquisition
EEG was recorded continuously from both participants using 32
active electrodes (Acticap, BrainProducts GmbH, Germany) per parti-
cipant, arranged according to an extended version of the 10–20 system
at Fz/3/4/7/8, FCz/1/2/5/6, Cz/3/4, CPz/1/2/5/6, Pz/3/4/7/8, Oz/
1/2, and T7/8, using carefully positioned nylon caps. All electrodes
were referenced to the right mastoid during recording. Vertical and
horizontal eye movements were monitored using two pairs of bipolar
EOG electrodes: one positioned under the left and right eyes and one
lateral to the left and right eyes. Electrode impedance was kept below
20 kΩ. EEG and EOG signals were ampliﬁed with a band-pass ﬁlter of
0–250 Hz by two BrainAmp DC Ampliﬁers (Brain Products GmbH,
Gilching, Germany) and sampled at 500 Hz.
2.5. Data processing and analysis
The video recordings of each experimental session were visually
examined and participants’ performance was evaluated on a trial-by-
trial basis. Trials during which a participant did not perform the action
designated by the pre-cue or when the action onset was not recorded for
Fig. 2. Joint actions performed by the participants. In total, there were four diﬀerent types of joint conﬁgurations. In two types of conﬁgurations, both participants
performed the same individual action (top, both palms facing outwards) and in the other two types of conﬁgurations the participants performed diﬀerent individual
actions (bottom, one palm facing outwards, one inwards). Note that the participant on the left performs the same individual action in both instances.
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mechanical reasons (e.g. when the response button was not pressed
hard enough) were removed from the analyses. Action onset was de-
ﬁned as the time interval between the onset of the Go stimulus and the
release of the response button. For each participant, all action onsets
that were smaller than 100ms or diﬀered more than two standard de-
viations from the mean action onset within each condition were re-
moved from further analysis. We also calculated (on a trial-by-trial
basis) the action onsets asynchronies within each pair of participants.
Our EEG analyses focused on the 1200ms time period between the
onset of the pre-cue and the Go cue, during which diﬀerent types of
action were planned but not executed. EEG data processing was per-
formed oﬄine using Brain Vision Analyzer 2.1.0 (Brain Products
GmbH, Germany). EEG data were ﬁrst re-referenced to the mean of
both mastoid electrodes. Ocular correction was performed using the
Gratton–Coles algorithm (Gratton et al., 1983). The data were then
ﬁltered using a low cut-oﬀ ﬁlter of 0.01Hz (24 dB/octave) and a high
cut-oﬀ ﬁlter of 40 Hz (24 dB/octave) to remove the inﬂuence of slow
drifts and excessive high-frequency noise, respectively. Then, the data
were segmented oﬄine into epochs from 400ms before until 2300ms
after pre-cue onset.
In addition to the trials that were removed for failing to meet be-
havioural criteria, semi-automatic artefact rejection was performed
before averaging in order to remove individual trials containing re-
maining vertical eye movements or other EEG-related artefacts. An
epoch was rejected when the diﬀerence between the maximum and
minimum value at a single channel exceeded 100 μV. Averages were
constructed separately for each condition and each participant. For the
ERP analysis, the baseline was deﬁned as the time period from 200ms
before pre-cue onset until pre-cue onset.
Time-frequency analysis was performed using a continuous complex
Morlet waveform transformation as implemented in the Brain Vision
Analyzer software. Absolute values of wavelets coeﬃcients were cal-
culated in the frequency range of 3–30Hz with 20 frequency steps and
Morlet parameter c= 4. The baseline was deﬁned as the interval from
300ms until 100ms before pre-cue onset. After averaging, the fre-
quency layer with central frequency 11.4Hz (Gauss borders 8.5Hz and
14.2Hz), was extracted for subsequent analysis.
Statistical analyses were performed by means of repeated measures
ANOVAs (Greenhouse–Geisser corrected). Post-hoc comparisons were
performed by means of paired t-tests (Bonferroni correction applied).
The regions of interests for EEG analyses were deﬁned on the basis of
grand average topographies and previous literature. The selection of the
time intervals of analyses were based on the aggregate grand average
from trials (AGAT) (Brooks et al., 2017). The P600 peaked around
580ms after pre-cue onset and it was quantiﬁed over fronto-central
(electrode FCz) and parietal areas (electrode Pz) as the mean amplitude
from 540 to 620ms after pre-cue onset. Visual inspection of the ERPs
showed that the absolute P600 amplitude depended on the amplitude of
the preceding N500, which peaked around 490ms after pre-cue onset.
Thus, the P600 was measured on a peak-to-peak basis with respect to
the N500, which was quantiﬁed as the mean amplitude from 470 to
510ms after pre-cue onset. The Contingent Negative Variation was
quantiﬁed as the mean amplitude during the last 200ms before the
onset of the Go stimulus over electrode FCz. The suppression of alpha/
mu rhythm was lateralized over sensorimotor areas and it was quanti-
ﬁed as the mean amplitude during the last 400ms before the onset of
the Go stimulus over the left and the right hemisphere (electrodes (C3,
CP1, and CP5) and (C4, CP2 and CP6), respectively.
3. Results
Behavioural and EEG preliminary analyses showed that the hand
(left or right) that participants performed their actions with did not
interact with the two main factors of interest: cueing of ‘Individual
Action’ and ‘Joint Conﬁguration’ (ps> .05). Thus all analyses are re-
ported on pooled data from both hands.
3.1. Behavioural analyses
The overall percentage of the trials that were removed from the
analyses was 11.1%. There was no diﬀerence in the percentage of trials
removed from diﬀerent conditions (all ps > .47).
Statistical comparisons were performed by means of repeated
measures 2 × 2 ANOVAs (Greenhouse–Geisser corrected) with the
factors Individual Action (‘I+’ vs. ‘I-’) and Joint Conﬁguration (‘We+’
vs. ‘We-’). The left panel in Fig. 4 displays the results for action onsets.
Participants were faster to initiate their actions when the pre-cue spe-
ciﬁed the Individual Action (F(1,23)= 47.73, p< .001, np2=.675) or
the Joint Conﬁguration (F(1,23)= 26.85, p< .001, np2=.539). The
interaction between these factors was not statistically signiﬁcant
(p= .880).
The right panel of Fig. 4 displays the action onset asynchronies.
These were smaller when the pre-cue speciﬁed the Joint Conﬁguration
(F(1,11)= 9.92, p= .009, np2=.474) but not when the pre-cue
Fig. 3. Pre-cues: The columns and rows refer to the aspects of the pre-cue that concerned Individual Action and Joint Conﬁguration, respectively.
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speciﬁed the Individual Action (p=0.601). The interaction between
these two factors was not signiﬁcant (p= .377).
The relatively large number of trials allowed us to perform an ad-
ditional analysis investigating whether the ‘Joint Conﬁguration’ eﬀect
depended on the type of Conﬁguration. We conducted a 2×2 ANOVAs
separately for the ‘Same’ and ‘Diﬀerent’ conﬁgurations. The analysis
showed that action onsets were shorter regardless of whether the spe-
ciﬁed Joint Conﬁguration was “Same” (F(1,11)= 29.31, p< .001,
np2=.560) or “Diﬀerent” (F(1,11)= 17.71, p< .001, np2=.435).
However, the action onset asynchronies were smaller only in the case of
‘Same’ Conﬁguration (F(1,11)= 6.27, p= .029, np2=.363), but not in
the case of ‘Diﬀerent’ Conﬁguration (p= .311).
3.2. EEG analyses
3.2.1. Event-related potentials
Statistical comparisons on the P600 amplitude (Fig. 5) were per-
formed by means of repeated measures 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA (Green-
house–Geisser corrected) with factors Individual Action (‘I+’ vs. ‘I-’),
Joint Conﬁguration (‘We+’ vs. ‘We-’) and Location (Fronto-Central
(FCz) vs. Parietal (Pz)). The statistical analysis showed that the P600
amplitude was smaller when the pre-cue speciﬁed the Individual Action
(F(1,23)= 16.12, p= .001, np2=.412). The main eﬀect Joint Conﬁg-
uration was not statistically signiﬁcant (p= .075); however, there was
a signiﬁcant ROI x Joint Conﬁguration interaction (F(1,23)= 9.95,
p= .004, np2=.302). Post-hoc paired t-test (adjusted level of sig-
niﬁcance a=.025) showed that the P600 amplitude was smaller when
the pre-cue speciﬁed the Joint Conﬁguration only over fronto-central
areas (t(23)= -2.54, p= .018) and not over parietal areas (p= .405).
The main eﬀect of ROI and all other interactions were not statistically
signiﬁcant (p> .107).
Statistical comparisons on the CNV amplitude (Fig. 6) were per-
formed by means of repeated measures 2 × 2 ANOVA (Green-
house–Geisser corrected) with factors Individual Action (‘I+’ vs. ‘I-’)
and Joint Conﬁguration (‘We+’ vs. ‘We-’). The statistical analysis
showed that the CNV amplitude was larger when the pre-cue speciﬁed
the Individual Action (F(1,23)= 12.51, p= .002, np2=.352), or the
Joint Conﬁguration (F(1,23)= 6.44, p= .018, np2=.219). The inter-
action between these factors was not statistically signiﬁcant (p= .800).
3.2.2. Neuronal oscillations
Statistical comparisons on the amplitude of the alpha/mu rhythm
(Fig. 7) were performed by means of a repeated measures 2 × 2 × 2
ANOVA (Greenhouse–Geisser corrected) with factors Individual Action
(‘I+’ vs. ‘I-’), Joint Conﬁguration (‘We+’ vs. ‘We-’) and Hemisphere
(Ipsilateral vs. Contralateral). The statistical analysis showed that alpha
suppression was greater not only when the pre-cue speciﬁed the In-
dividual Action (F(1,23)= 12.59, p= .002, np2=.354), but also when
the pre-cue speciﬁed the Joint Conﬁguration (F(1,23)= 5.60, p= .027,
np2=.196). In addition, alpha suppression was greater over the con-
tralateral hemisphere to the acting hand (F(1,23)= 6.74, p= .016,
np2=.227).
None of the interactions reached statistical signiﬁcance (ps> .22),
with the exception of the three-way Hemisphere x Individual Action x
Joint Conﬁguration interaction (F(1,23)= 13.28, p= .001, np2=.366).
We explored the source of this interaction by investigating alpha sup-
pression separately for ipsilateral and contralateral hemispheres. A
2×2 ANOVA for the ipsilateral hemisphere revealed signiﬁcant main
eﬀects for Individual Action (F(1,23)= 9.39, p= .005, np2=.290) and
for Joint Conﬁguration (F(1,23)= 4.87, p= .038, np2=.175), but no
signiﬁcant interaction (p=936). A 2×2 ANOVA for the contralateral
hemisphere revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for Individual Action (F
(1,23)= 11.81, p= .002, np2=.339), a numerical but not statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect for Joint Conﬁguration (p= .062), but also a sig-
niﬁcant interaction between these two factors (F(1,23)= 7.16,
p= .013, np2=.237). Post-hoc paired t-tests (adjusted level of sig-
niﬁcance, a=.025) revealed that when the pre-cue speciﬁed the
Individual Action there was no diﬀerence (p = .502) if the Joint
Conﬁguration was also speciﬁed (I+We+ vs. I+We-). When the
Individual action was not speciﬁed, the speciﬁcation of the Joint con-
ﬁguration (I-We+ vs. I-We-) induced greater alpha suppression (t
(23)= -3.33, p=0.003). This pattern of results raises the possibility
that the ipsilateral hemisphere has a more important role in the re-
presentation of interpersonal action parameters. However, this is a
tentative interpretation that would require further systematic in-
vestigation that is beyond the scope of the present study.
4. Discussion
We investigated whether individuals form action plans at the group-
level when they plan to perform a joint action with another person. We
showed that specifying whether a joint conﬁguration consisted of the
same or of diﬀerent individual actions had a robust beneﬁcial eﬀect on
task performance and modulated the amplitude of several EEG indices
of cognitive (P600) and sensorimotor representations (alpha/mu
rhythm and late CNV) in action planning. Our ﬁndings share simila-
rities with a previous study, which also employed a pre-cueing task to
investigate the planning phase of bimanual ﬁnger tapping performed by
Fig. 4. Left: Mean Action Onsets were shorter when the pre-cue speciﬁed the Individual Action (I+) and/or the Joint Conﬁguration (We+). Right: Action Onset
Asynchronies were smaller only when the pre-cue speciﬁed the Joint conﬁguration (We+). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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a single individual (Deiber et al., 2005). Despite several methodological
diﬀerences (e.g. longer planning period, only in-phase tapping move-
ments were analysed), Deiber et al. (2005) showed that specifying in
advance the relation between the actions of two diﬀerent eﬀectors (e.g.
in-phase tapping) beneﬁted performance and resulted in enhancement
of alpha suppression and CNV amplitude, even if the participants did
not know in advance which ﬁnger (i.e. index or little ﬁnger) they had to
tap with. Our ﬁndings extend this pattern of results to joint action
planning and show that specifying in advance the relation between the
actions of eﬀectors that belong to two diﬀerent individuals aﬀects ac-
tion planning processes and facilitates joint action performance.
4.1. We-representations facilitate joint task performance
Our behavioural results clearly showed that participants took into
account the information that speciﬁed the joint conﬁguration and uti-
lized it to initiate their actions faster. Action initiation was faster not
only when the pre-cue speciﬁed the individual action to be performed
by the participants, but, importantly, when it merely speciﬁed the joint
conﬁguration (same or diﬀerent). This demonstrates that participants
did not only form representations of potential individual actions but
also represented how their own action would relate to their partner's
action. Furthermore, it shows that action representations at the group
level (We-representations) do not require the speciﬁcation of co-actors’
individual action contributions. Rather, they can be formed in-
dependently of “I” and “You” action representations. This, in turn, re-
duced the number of possible joint conﬁgurations that the co-acting
participants had to prepare for, enabling faster action initiation. To il-
lustrate, when participants received a pre-cue instructing them to
execute the “same” action as their partner, this helped them prepare for
the remaining two possible conﬁgurations (both palms facing inwards
or both palms facing outwards) even though they did not know which
individual action to plan for. Moreover, action onsets were more syn-
chronized when the pre-cue indicated to participants that they were
going to perform the same action, even if they did not know which
individual action to perform. Unfortunately, the present setup did not
allow us to obtain synchronization measurements during the execution
phase, but it is likely that the better alignment of action onsets also
implied more synchronous performance. This eﬀect was absent when
the participants performed diﬀerent actions, possibly due to the me-
chanics of performing the movements required in the present study.
Arm extension with the palm facing inwards requires the rotation of the
wrist, whereas arm extension with the palm facing outwards does not
require wrist rotation. The participants, in our study, were asked to try
to synchronize their actions, but they received no instructions as to how
to achieve this. Thus, it is conceivable that synchronization of diﬀerent
actions does not necessarily beneﬁt alignment of action onsets if dif-
ferent movement are to be performed.
Fig. 5. [A] ERP waveforms based on the average data (Avg) of all conditions (electrode FCz). The grey-shaded areas represent the time intervals for the quantiﬁcation
of the peak-to-peak P600 amplitude. [B} ERP waveforms (electrode FCz) in each condition (the arrows point at the N500 and P600 intervals of analysis). [C] Peak-to-
peak P600 amplitudes (electrode FCz). [D] Voltage scalp topographies based on average data of all conditions (Avg), the diﬀerence between the conditions where the
pre-cue did or did not specify the individual action ((I-) – (I+)), and the diﬀerence between the conditions where the pre-cue did or did not specify the joint
conﬁguration ((We-) – (We+)).
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It may be argued that our ﬁndings do not reﬂect the formation of a
joint action plan, but simply the fact that the participants were in-
formed of the other person's expected action. Although our design did
not include a condition in which the participants acted in parallel but
without the requirement of interpersonal synchronization, we believe
that this alternative interpretation cannot account for several aspect of
the present results. First, it is unclear why an additional piece of in-
formation, seemingly unrelated to a person's planned action, would
have a positive eﬀect on the speed of action onsets and interpersonal
synchronization. Second, the direct comparison between the I-We+
and the I-We-conditions shows that, although the participants were
equally ‘ignorant’ of the other person's action, knowing the relation of
their planned (still unspeciﬁed) action and the other person's expected
(still unspeciﬁed) action had a clear beneﬁcial eﬀect for their perfor-
mance.
The ﬁnding that individuals form action plans not only at an in-
dividual level, but also at a group level is in line with previous research
demonstrating that individuals are capable of forming “We-re-
presentations” that may facilitate the performance of a joint task (Della
Gatta et al., 2017; Dewey et al., 2014; Ramenzoni et al., 2014; Sacheli
et al., 2018; Tsai et al., 2011; Van der Wel, 2015). The present study
extends this research by tracking the formation of We-representations
and their eﬀects on action preparation during joint action planning.
4.2. Disambiguation in action planning
The EEG analyses provided further insight into the processes of
planning a joint task. Conﬁrming our prediction, the P600 amplitude
over frontal areas was smaller after pre-cues that reduced the number of
possible joint conﬁgurations, either by specifying parameters of the
individual action or parameters of the joint conﬁguration. The P600 is
generally associated with representation of structures (Lelekov-Boissard
and Dominey, 2002) and, speciﬁcally over frontal areas, the re-
presentation of ambiguous structures (Friederici et al., 2002; Kaan and
Swaab, 2003; Opitz and Kotz, 2012). A joint action plan may be re-
garded as a structured mental representation consisting of the co-actors’
potential actions and the ways that they might relate to each other.
Accordingly in the present study, the decrease of the P600 amplitude
after speciﬁcation of the joint conﬁguration, regardless of the speciﬁ-
cation of the individual actions, suggests that the participants were
Fig. 6. [A]: ERP waveforms based on the average data of all conditions (electrode FCz). The grey-shaded areas represent the time intervals for the quantiﬁcation of
CNV amplitude. [B] CNV amplitudes. [C] Voltage scalp topographies of the diﬀerence between the conditions where the pre-cue did or did not specify the individual
action ((I-) – (I+)), and the diﬀerence between the conditions where the pre-cue did or did not specify the joint conﬁguration ((We-) – (We+)).
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capable of using information that described the task at the group level
in order to reduce the number of the potential action outcomes and
form a more precise (i.e. less ambiguous) joint action plan.
4.3. We-representations at the sensorimotor level
Also consistent with our predictions, speciﬁcation of the individual
actions as well as of the joint conﬁguration by the pre-cue resulted in
enhancement of the alpha/mu rhythm and of the late CNV amplitude.
Suppression of the sensorimotor alpha/mu rhythm prior to an action is
related to planning processes (Behmer and Fournier, 2014; Kourtis
et al., 2013a, 2013b) and it may also reﬂect processing of interpersonal
coordination (Yin et al., 2017). Importantly, the alpha/mu suppression
in the present study was lateralized over primary sensorimotor areas
contralateral to the acting hand, which strongly suggests that it re-
ﬂected action preparation and not simply anticipation of the centrally-
presented Go cue (Pfurtscheller et al., 1997). According to our hy-
pothesis, this shows that the participants were able to use the in-
formation provided by the pre-cue, regarding individual or relational
action parameters, in order to reduce the number of the possible joint
conﬁguration that they needed to prepare for and form more precise
predictive sensorimotor representations of the remaining possible joint
action goals/outcomes.
An alternative interpretation is that the lateralization pattern was
caused by an amplitude increase of alpha/mu oscillations over the ip-
silateral hemisphere to the acting hand, reﬂecting inhibition of task-
irrelevant neuronal populations (Brinkman et al., 2014; Brinkman et al.,
2016). Although we did not record any increase in the amplitude of
alpha oscillations, it is possible that such eﬀect was masked by the
overall suppression of parieto-occipital alpha, which probably indicated
activation of visual areas in anticipation of the Go stimulus and the
subsequent arm movements (Onoda et al., 2007; Van Dijk et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, regardless of whether the lateralization of alpha/mu
suppression reﬂects representation of the remaining possible joint ac-
tion outcomes or representation of the excluded (by the pre-cue) joint
action outcomes, our ﬁndings suggest that information about inter-
personal action parameters are utilized by primary sensorimotor areas
in the service of interpersonal coordination.
In addition to alpha oscillations, information concerning the joint
conﬁguration that the two action partners were required to achieve,
resulted in the enhancement of the late CNV amplitude. The late CNV in
motor tasks is considered and index of optimal, time-locked action
preparation (Kononowicz and Penney, 2016; Leuthold et al., 2004; Van
Rijn et al., 2011) and it has been shown to be enhanced when two
actions are prepared by one or two persons in parallel (Kourtis et al.,
2014). The scalp topography of the modulation of the late CNV in the
present study is consistent with activation of the Supplementary Motor
Area (SMA), which is known to contribute largely to the amplitude of
Fig. 7. [A] Time-frequency plots (average data) of the diﬀerence between the conditions where the pre-cue did or did not specify Individual Action (Left) or Joint
Conﬁguration (Right). For both factors the diﬀerence in alpha suppression (in blue) becomes evident around 400ms before the onset of the Go cue. [B] Amplitude of
alpha/mu rhythm during the last 400ms before Go onset (average data). [C] Scalp topographies of alpha/mu distribution: Average (Avg) of all conditions and
Lateralization of alpha activity before Go onset, created by subtracting the activity of the ipsilateral hemisphere from that of the contralateral hemisphere separately
for each hand and then averaging the two diﬀerences.
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the late CNV (Cui et al., 2000; Leuthold et al., 2004; Nagai et al., 2004)
and is central to the planning and coordination of multiple movements
(Macuga and Frey, 2012; Obhi et al., 2002). Accordingly, the enhanced
late CNV indicates that participants were capable of using advance
information about their individual action and more importantly about
the joint conﬁguration in order to optimize the planning of a task that
required coordination of the two partners’ actions. Crucially, this was
the case even in the condition where participants were only informed
about the joint conﬁguration that they had to prepare for, but not about
the speciﬁc individual actions they and their partner were required to
perform.
Our ﬁndings have broader theoretical implications in the ﬁeld of
sensorimotor control. Research in primates has demonstrated that
multiple potential reaching actions can be represented in parallel in
distinct neuronal populations within premotor and primary motor areas
(Bastian et al., 2003; Cisek and Kalaska, 2005). Comparable results
have been also reposted in human participants that showed that the
amplitude of several EEG indices of action preparation are modulated
by the number of potential actions (Praamstra et al., 2009). This in-
dicates that the processes of action selection and action speciﬁcation
may evolve in parallel and in a continuous manner (Cisek and Kalaska,
2010). The ﬁndings of the present study provide an additional dimen-
sion, showing that information that concerns the relation of a person's
potential actions to a co-actor's potential actions can be processed and
represented in advance in the motor system as a means for optimizing
interpersonal coordination.
4.4. Implications for social cognition research
The present results also have broader implications for our under-
standing of social cognition. Much research has been concerned with
the question of how theory of mind allows us to overcome the gap
between our own and others' minds and contributes to building
common ground (e.g., Apperly, 2018; Schaafsma et al., 2015). While
many social interactions indeed require the ability to attribute mental
states to others and to keep them apart from one's own, it is interesting
to note that coordination in joint action may be achieved through joint
action plans in the form of We-representations. These provide a fun-
damental level of sociality that comes from having mental structures
that do not merely represent individual actions, but relations between
own and others' actions. Planning structures that directly relate the
actions of self and other also provide a way to specify the somewhat
elusive concept of a “We-mode” (Gallotti and Frith, 2013; Searle,
1990). Interesting questions for future research are whether We-re-
presentations can be traced in other forms of joint tasks that do not
involve spatiotemporal coordination of actions, and whether their for-
mation hinges on the spatial and/or social proximity between task
partners.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, our study shows that people are capable of forming
predictive cognitive as well as sensorimotor representations at the
group-level (“We-representations”), which have beneﬁcial eﬀects in the
performance of a joint task.
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